Security, defence and dual-use trade between Canada and China: what official sources show

The 5th Defence Coordination Dialogue of 2026-09-04: what each government said

On 2026-09-04 Canadian and Chinese defence officials held the 5th Defence Coordination Dialogue in Canada, the first since April 2018. The only government publication is Chinese. China's Ministry of National Defense wrote on 2026-09-05: "The two sides had a candid and in-depth exchange of views on international and regional issues of mutual interest, expressed willingness to strengthen practical exchanges and cooperation between the two militaries, and enhanced mutual understanding and trust."

Canada's Department of National Defence (DND) published nothing itself. Its position is known only from a statement given to media and reported by the Globe and Mail and by CBC, which are listed below as non-official sources for that reason. DND said: "As part of ongoing working-level dialogue, Canadian and Chinese defence officials met on September 4, in support of ongoing military-to-military communications at the functional level." It added: "Under this framework, there are specific areas in which we will seek deeper cooperation with China and areas where we will not, which includes on defence."

The two governments therefore describe one meeting differently. According to CBC, the Chinese Embassy called it a resumption of military talks after eight years, and DND would not confirm that framing.

No joint exercises since 2018, no defence agreement, no defence trade

The dialogue is an old channel, not a new agreement. On 2013-06-03 the two defence ministers agreed to establish a Defence Coordination Dialogue, and DND describes the related Cooperation Plan Initiative as "a non-binding cooperation arrangement signed in 2013". Four sessions followed: 2013-11-28, 2014-09-23, 2016-11-28 and 2018-04-10. The channel then lapsed for more than eight years.

On exercises, DND's own record says: "The last time the Canadian Armed Forces engaged in bilateral military training exercises with China was in 2018." It adds that in winter 2019 Canada cancelled plans to invite the People's Liberation Army to observe winter survival training.

The January 2026 joint statement, news release and readout contain no defence or military item. Their "public safety and security" pillar is about law enforcement. The foreign ministers' readouts of May 2026, from both sides, contain no defence item either, and DND's news listing for 2026-09-01 to 2026-09-17 has no China item.

Defence trade remains closed. No official source reports defence-industrial cooperation, military goods still need an export permit, and Notice to Exporters No. 1003 says Canada treats sensitive exports to Hong Kong the same way as those destined for China.

What this guide does not say

This site looked for official evidence of military cooperation between Canada and China and found none as of 2026-09-17. No official Canadian or Chinese source that this site opened reports any of the following:

• joint military exercises or training since 2018;
• a defence agreement or a new arrangement between the two militaries;
• port visits, peacekeeping exchanges or disaster relief exchanges between the Canadian Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Army;
• defence-industrial cooperation, or any easing of Canadian controls on military exports to China.

What the record shows is narrower. One working-level dialogue channel met again on 2026-09-04. China's defence ministry described it in the language of exchanges and cooperation. Canada's defence department told media that it was communication at the functional level and that defence is an area where Canada will not seek deeper cooperation.

Phrases such as "increased military collaboration", "defence partnership" or "military cooperation agreement" are not supported by that record. Readers who meet claims of a Canada-China defence partnership in media, marketing material or social media should treat them with caution and ask which official document supports them. This page will be revised if either government publishes something new.

Where cooperation did increase: law enforcement and political-security dialogue

The joint statement of 2026-01-16 says the two sides "committed to strengthening law enforcement cooperation to combat corruption and transnational crimes, including telecommunication and cyber fraud and illegal synthetic drugs in accordance with their respective laws". They agreed to continue the annual law enforcement cooperation working group, "under which a counternarcotics dialogue is a key part". A Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Combating Crimes was signed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and China's Ministry of Public Security.

The text of that memorandum has not been published, and no official page carries it. Global News, listed below as a non-official source for that reason, quotes the RCMP as saying that it "will not unilaterally make public or share the contents of an MOU with a third party without the concurrence of the other party".

On 2026-05-29 the foreign ministers welcomed "the resumption of the Political and Security Consultation mechanism between their ministries" and the "reestablishment of the National Security and Rule of Law Dialogue", and noted continuing dialogue between law enforcement authorities, including on counternarcotics. These are foreign ministry and police channels, not military ones. This site found no public record that either mechanism has met yet.

Continuing military friction: the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea

Canada's operational posture did not change with the dialogue.

• Taiwan Strait. DND confirmed to media that HMCS Charlottetown made "a routine transit through the Taiwan Strait" on 2026-05-22 and 2026-05-23. DND did not publish this on its website, so the Globe and Mail is listed as a non-official source. Asked about the transit on 2026-05-29, China's foreign ministry spokesperson said China "firmly opposes acts that undermine China's sovereignty and security in the name of freedom of navigation".
• One-China commitment. In an interview published by the Chinese Embassy on 2026-07-01, Ambassador Wang Di said: "We hope that the Canadian side can honour its one-China commitment with concrete actions."
• South China Sea. DND stated that HMCS Regina took part in a Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity with the Philippines and the United States on 2026-09-11, one week after the dialogue.
• Earlier incident. On 2023-11-03 the Canadian Armed Forces reported unsafe intercepts of a Canadian helicopter by Chinese fighter aircraft over the South China Sea.

CBC also reports that the Leader of the Opposition rejected military cooperation with China, so the subject is contested in Canadian politics. For business, these are political risk factors that sit alongside tariff relief from China that currently runs only to 2026-12-31.

Continuing economic-security measures in Canada

Canada's national security measures affecting Chinese companies stayed in place through the 2026 thaw.

• Telecommunications. On 2022-05-19 the government announced that it would prohibit Huawei and ZTE products and services in Canada's telecommunications systems. The prohibition remains.
• Investment orders. The national security decisions list records the order of 2025-06-27 that Hikvision Canada, Inc. be wound up, the dissolution of Bluvec Technologies and Pegauni Technology (2024-05-24), and three lithium divestitures (2022-11-02). The wind-up ordered for TikTok Technology Canada on 2024-11-06 was replaced on 2026-03-09 by approval subject to binding undertakings.
• Official warning to business. Global Affairs Canada's country page, modified 2026-09-14, still warns of "market access barriers, opaque regulations with uneven and arbitrary implementation, prevalent and persistent intellectual property theft, and the risk of diversion of sensitive goods and technologies intended for civilian use for military purposes and applications".
• Strategy. Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy describes China as "an increasingly disruptive global power".

Foreign interference, forced labour and human rights were also raised by Canada's foreign minister with her Chinese counterpart on 2026-05-29.

Canadian export controls and permits for China

Any item on Canada's Export Control List (ECL) needs an export permit from Global Affairs Canada before it goes to China. The current Guide to Canada's Export Control List is the January 2026 edition, effective 2026-05-01. Its groups are: 1 Dual-Use; 2 Munitions; 3 Nuclear Non-Proliferation; 4 Nuclear-Related Dual-Use; 5 Miscellaneous Goods and Technology, which includes United States origin goods and item 5505, a catch-all for weapons of mass destruction end uses; 6 Missile Technology Control Regime; 7 Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation; and 9 Arms Trade Treaty items. Group 8 is repealed. Recent additions cover quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and metal additive manufacturing.

Points that matter for China:

• Technology transfers by email, cloud access or technical assistance count as exports.
• The Area Control List contains only North Korea. China is not on it, so the test is whether the item is on the ECL.
• Notice to Exporters No. 1003 (2020-07-07) says Canada treats sensitive exports to Hong Kong "in the same way as those destined for China" and will not permit the export of sensitive military items to Hong Kong.
• There is no published stand-alone China policy for permits. Global Affairs Canada will give an advisory opinion on control status if asked.

The Controlled Goods Program: controls inside Canada

Export permits deal with goods leaving Canada. The Controlled Goods Program, run by Public Services and Procurement Canada under the Defence Production Act, deals with access inside Canada. Anyone who examines, possesses or transfers controlled goods in Canada must register.

Controlled goods include goods and technical data with military or national security significance, defence articles controlled under the United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and goods made from ITAR technical data. Registration involves security assessments of owners, officers and employees. Foreign visitors and temporary workers need exemptions. Penalties reach CAD 2,000,000 and 10 years' imprisonment.

This matters to Canadian companies with Chinese shareholders, employees or visitors, because access inside Canada by a person who is not registered or exempt is itself an offence, even if nothing is exported. The points to check are whether the company holds controlled goods at all, whether its registration is current, and whether every foreign national with access has been assessed or exempted.

Sanctions list checks and end-use screening

Sanctions. The Special Economic Measures (People's Republic of China) Regulations came into force on 2021-03-21. They impose an asset freeze and a dealings ban on listed persons tied to human rights violations in Xinjiang. Eight more individuals were added on 2024-12-09, and a permit authorization order was issued on 2025-02-26. The practical tool is the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List, last updated 2026-09-04, which covers listings under the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act and can be searched or downloaded.

End use. Global Affairs Canada states that the aim of its export controls is that Canadian goods and technology are not used in a way prejudicial to human rights, peace, security or stability, and its country page warns of diversion of civilian goods to military use. ECL item 5505 applies to any goods or technology destined for a weapons of mass destruction end use.

What a compliance file normally records:

• the ECL classification of the item, or an advisory opinion;
• list checks on the buyer, consignee, end user and intermediaries, with dates;
• a signed end-use and end-user statement;
• any routing through Hong Kong or a third country.

Research security lists and Investment Canada Act national security review

Research security. The Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern has applied since 2024-05-01. Grant applications to the federal granting councils and the Canada Foundation for Innovation that advance a listed sensitive technology research area will not be funded if any named researcher is affiliated with, or receives funding or in-kind support from, a Named Research Organization. Researchers sign attestations that last for the life of the grant. There are 11 sensitive technology categories, from advanced digital infrastructure and advanced materials to artificial intelligence, quantum science and robotics (page dated 2026-07-30). The Named Research Organizations list includes institutions in China, Russia and Iran. Companies that co-fund university research through federal partnership grants are affected.

Investment review. National security review under the Investment Canada Act can apply to an investment of any size. Guidelines updated in March 2025 add economic security and list defence capabilities, sensitive technology transfer, critical minerals, critical infrastructure and sensitive personal data among the factors. Investors are encouraged to file at least 45 days before closing. Thresholds, orders and statistics are in the guide on investing between Canada and China.

China's export controls: dual-use items, rare earths and other critical minerals

China's Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (State Council Order 792) took effect on 2024-12-01 with a single Dual-Use Items Export Control List. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issues the licences. The Chinese exporter applies, and the foreign buyer supplies end-user and end-use documents. The regulations provide for a Watch List of importers and end users that do not cooperate with verification, and a Control List of foreign entities to which exports are prohibited or restricted. Article 49 lets MOFCOM apply the rules to foreign-made items that contain Chinese-origin controlled items. Canada's Trade Commissioner Service says standard processing can take up to 45 working days.

Licensing now in force:

• gallium and germanium items, from 2023-08-01 (Announcement 2023 No. 23);
• graphite items, from 2023-12-01 (Announcement 2023 No. 39);
• antimony and superhard materials, from 2024-09-15 (Announcement 2024 No. 33);
• seven medium and heavy rare earths (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium), including alloys, oxides, compounds and magnets, from 2025-04-04 (Announcement 2025 No. 18).

Announcement 2025 No. 70 suspended the October 2025 package until 2026-11-10. That package includes Announcement 2025 No. 61, which would control foreign-made items containing 0.1% or more Chinese rare earths. What applies after 2026-11-10 has to be checked on MOFCOM's site.

China's Unreliable Entity List, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, data and counter-espionage laws

Unreliable Entity List. On 2025-10-09 the list's working mechanism added TechInsights Inc., a Canadian company, and seven of its affiliates, in the same announcement as the Halifax International Security Forum. The measures are a ban on China-related import and export activity, a ban on new investment in China, and a ban on organizations and individuals in China transacting or cooperating with them, in particular transferring data or sensitive information to them. This list is separate from the export control Control List.

Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. Under this law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Order No. 15, effective 2024-12-21, imposed countermeasures on two Canadian organizations, the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project and the Canada-Tibet Committee, and 20 of their personnel: an asset freeze in China, a ban on transactions and cooperation, and an entry ban that includes Hong Kong and Macao.

Data and counter-espionage. The Data Security Law, the Personal Information Protection Law, the Cyberspace Administration's provisions on cross-border data flows and the Counter-Espionage Law are linked below in Chinese. This site did not verify their details on pages it read in full, so it does not summarize them. Canada's travel advice for China warns of broad national security laws, arbitrary enforcement of local laws and exit bans.